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ABSTRACT
Recent papers by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) uncover a
dramatic decline in the volatility of U.S. GDP growth beginning in 1984. Determining whether the
source is good luck, good policy or better inventory management has since developed into an active
area of research. This paper seeks to shed light on the source of the decline in volatility by studying
the behavior of the U.S. automobile industry, where the changes in volatility have mirrored those
of the aggregate data. We find that changes in the relative volatility of sales and output, which have
been interpreted by some as evidence of improved inventory management, are in fact the result of
changes in the process driving automobile sales. We first show that the autocorrelation of sales
dropped during the 1980s, and that the behavior of interest rates may be the force behind the change
in sales persistence. A simulation of the assembly plants' cost function illustrates that the persistence
of sales is a key determinant of output volatility. A comparison of the ways in which assembly plants
scheduled production in the 1990s relative to the 1970s supports the intuition of the simulation.
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Recent papers by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)
uncover a dramatic decline in the volatility of the U.S. economy beginning in 1984.  The
volatility of GDP growth since 1984 has been 50 percent lower than it was in the post-war period
before 1984.  Interestingly, statistical tests point to a structural break in the first quarter of 1984
rather than to a gradual decline.  The phenomenon also appears to extend beyond U.S. borders.
Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003a) show that all G-7 countries save
Japan have experienced a decline in volatility in recent periods, though the timing and nature of
the declines vary by country.
This discovery raises an important question: Has output volatility declined in a
meaningful and permanent way, or have we simply enjoyed a reprieve from the turbulence of the
1970s and early 1980s?  Possible answers to this question depend on which of the three leading
explanations for the decline in volatility is most accurate:  (1) Good Luck, (2) Good Policy, or
(3) Structural Change.  The "Good Luck” hypothesis argues that the decline in volatility is a
result of a fortuitous decline in the volatility of shocks hitting the economy (e.g. Ahmed, Levin,
and Wilson (2000), Stock and Watson (2002)).  Advocates of the “Good Policy” hypothesis
argue that a systematically more decisive and more transparent monetary policy has been the key
source of the decline in volatility of the U.S. economy (e.g. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000),
Boivin and Giannoni (2002) and McCarthy and Zakrajšek (2003)).  Finally, the “Structural
Change” hypothesis refers to the innovations in manufacturing technology and inventory
management that allow smooth production along the supply chain (e.g. Kahn, McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2002) and Irvine and Schuh (2002)).  This potential source has recently received a
lot of attention, as the decline in the volatility of aggregate output exceeds that of final sales.
Despite a rapidly developing literature in this area, answering this question in a definitive
way has proven to be difficult.  First, a significant reduction in volatility has been discovered
almost universally across the U.S. economy.  Aggregate volatility patterns thus provide little help
in narrowing the focus to a particular change in the economic environment or to the contribution3
of a particular input.
1  Second, the conclusions reached from time-series analysis on aggregate
data have been difficult to interpret.  The reduction in GDP volatility seems to stem from a
decline in the volatility of shocks, which are typically the forecast errors that result from a vector
autoregression model of the U.S. economy.  To further associate these forecast errors with
measurable shocks, such as monetary and fiscal shocks, productivity shocks, supply shocks, etc.,
however, has not met with success.
2
This study addresses the decline in U.S. GDP volatility in the context of decisions made
at the plant level in an industry at the forefront of this change – the U.S. automobile industry.
Not only has the automobile industry experienced a sharp decline in its volatility during the
1980s, but it is also an industry often examined by economists such as Blanchard (1983) to
understand the interaction between inventories and the volatility of output.  Using aggregate
automobile industry data as well as a new disaggregated dataset that tracks weekly production
scheduling at automobile assembly plants between 1972 and 2001, we investigate the extent to
which the decline in volatility stems from structural changes in the process governing sales
versus structural changes in the process governing production.  We conclude that the decline in
output volatility is linked to (1) a decline in the measured persistence of sales shocks and (2)
plant-level non-convexities in production scheduling.  In particular, sales are far less serially
correlated after 1984 than they were during the 1970s and early 1980s, and interest rates appear
to be a source of the change.  We demonstrate that an inventory model involving non-convex
costs predicts that a decline in the persistence of sales shocks leads to a decline in the variance of
production relative to the variance of sales and to a decline in the covariance of inventory
investment and sales.  Finally, we show that the type of data used by other researchers may hide
a change in persistence in other parts of the economy.  Thus, recent evidence suggesting no
change in the persistence of final sales overall may be an artifact of the data.
The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section II explains the connection between
output volatility, inventory investment and improvements in information and production
                                                          
1 Stock and Watson (2002) test 168 U.S. macroeconomic time-series and discover the pervasiveness of this volatility
decline in measures of output, employment, investment and inflation.  Manufacturing has been more impacted that
services, however, and durable goods output volatility has experienced a particularly steep reduction.
2 Stock and Watson (2002) search over several identifiable shocks in the U.S., and Stock and Watson (2003a) do so
again for all G7 countries.  In both cases, the behavior of observable shocks is quite different from that of the
forecast errors of GDP growth.4
technologies.  Section III demonstrates that the automobile industry is suitable for this case study
and presents evidence that the process governing automobile sales has changed noticeably in the
post-1984 period.  Section IV addresses how a change in sales persistence interacts with
production decisions in a simulation featuring the non-convex production costs typical in this
industry.  Section V confronts our theory with a panel of production scheduling variables across
U.S. assembly plants.  Section VI discusses whether the automobile industry results may be
extended to the rest of the economy, and Section VII concludes.
II.  The Information Technology Explanation
Innovations in information and production technology have transformed U.S.
manufacturing in many important ways in recent decades. The current question is whether
technological change also underlies the moderation in GDP volatility.  Kahn, McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2002), hereafter KMPQ, give perhaps the most compelling evidence that it has.
They argue that the decline in GDP volatility is most closely matched in magnitude and in timing
by a similar reduction within the durable goods sector.
3  KMPQ further argue that the adoption
of new machine tool technologies and inventory control systems occurred most rapidly during
the 1980s within the durable goods sector.  Thus, the “Information Technology Hypothesis”
posits that production lines and inventory distribution systems now respond more rapidly to sales
conditions than they used to, and this improvement has moderated the response of production to
sales shocks.
Two of the most striking pieces of statistical evidence presented by KMPQ in favor of
this hypothesis are the differential declines in final sales versus production volatility and the
changing covariance of inventory investment with final sales.  To see how this evidence relates
to inventory management, consider the standard inventory identity  tt t YS I =+ ∆ , where Y is
production, S is sales, and ∆  I is the change in inventories.  For stationary variables, we have the
following relationship between the variance of production and the variance of sales:
                                                          
3 Kim, Nelson, and Piger (2001) present evidence of structural breaks across broad sectors.  McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000), Warnock and Warnock (2000), and Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) offer evidence that
the durable goods sector plays the most important role.  Stock and Watson (2002) claim residential fixed investment
played an equally large role as durable goods production.5
(1)  () () ( )2 (, ) tt t t t Var Y Var S Var I Cov S I =+ ∆ + ∆  .
The standard version of the production-smoothing model of inventories predicts that the variance
of production should be less than the variance of sales.  Thus, the covariance of inventory
investment and sales should be negative.  Historically, the opposite has been true.
KMPQ apply a version of this formula to growth rates of chain-weighted production,
sales, and inventory investment in the durable goods industry and find that the variance of
production fell by a much larger share from the pre-1984 period to the post-1984 period than did
the variance of final sales.  Moreover, the covariance of inventory investment and sales in
durable goods turned from being positive in the early period to negative in the post-1984 period.
4
Instead of contributing to the volatility of the economy as they once did, inventories now appear
to stabilize production.
The connection between the “Information Technology (IT)” hypothesis and the
covariance of inventories with sales is as follows: Information technology innovations, such as
electronic scanning of bar codes, allow for automatic restocking based on real-time sales
information and facilitate higher efficiency along the entire supply line.  Elements of flexible
manufacturing, such as computer numerically controlled machine tools, have additionally led to
a reduction in set-up times required to produce different specifications of goods.  This change in
set-up costs lowers optimal batch size, which varies inversely with inventory levels.  Both of
these innovations would be expected to reduce desired inventory-sales ratios.  A reduction in the
desired inventory-sales ratio should weaken or eliminate the tendency for inventories to be so
pro-cyclical, and hence so destabilizing.
The volatility and covariance measurements suggest that an explanation of the decline in
aggregate output volatility must be consistent with the following observations: (1) The source
must have particularly strong effects on the durable goods sector as opposed to nondurables and
services; and (2) the effect on production should be more pronounced that the effect on final
sales.  KMPQ argue that these observations cast doubt on the “better monetary policy”
explanation since one should expect it to work mostly through sales.
                                                          
4 Golob (2000) first discovered this switch in the sign of the covariance term.6
While the changes observed in variance and covariance are consistent with the hypothesis
that information technology and inventory management are the source of the decline in volatility,
this conclusion is not supported by specific studies of inventory control methods and their effects
on output volatility.  McCarthy and Zakrajšek (2003) cite numerous articles from the operations
research literature that do draw a connection between improved inventory control methods and a
lower inventory-to-sales ratio at various stages of processing, but fail to find significant effects
on output volatility.  Similarly, Feroli (2002) models the optimal inventory-to-sales ratio as a
function of input prices, where inventories serve as an input to production that is substitutable
with equipment and software.  While declines in the relative user cost of information technology
can explain a declining inventory-to-sales ratio quite well, the impact on output volatility is
minute.
Patterns in U.S. inventory data also pose two puzzles for the IT hypothesis.  The first is
why technology adoption, which usually follows an S-curve, should show up as a one-time
structural break in volatility.  The second concerns the inventory-sales ratio. As discussed above,
we would expect information technology innovations to reduce both the inventory-sales ratio and
the volatility of output in a similar way if they were the source of these changes.  The data do not
give such a clear picture.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of nonfarm inventories to final sales since 1947.  The data are in
chained dollars, which best measure the real trend since the current-dollar ratio’s trend is driven
by relative price changes (see Ramey and Vine (forthcoming)).  Two distinct features in the
graph are important.  First, there is a large run-up in the inventory-sales ratio that begins in the
late 1960s and lasts through the early 1980s.  Second, there is an overall decline in the inventory-
sales ratio in the early 1980s through the present. While some industries may currently hold
historically low levels of inventory relative to sales, the aggregate inventory-sales ratio since the
early 1980s is still higher than it was during the 1950s and 1960s.  KMPQ demonstrate that the
volatility of GDP and durable goods was approximately equal across the periods 1953–1968 and
1969–1983, before falling in 1984.  Thus, the behavior of the inventory-sales ratio does not line
up very closely with the changes in volatility over time.
In sum, while the changes in relative variances and covariances are consistent with a
change in production management, other parts of the story are not necessarily consistent with the7
data.  As we show below, even the observed changes in relative variances and covariances are
not necessarily indicative of changes in production management.
III.  Structural Change in the U.S. Automobile Industry
As noted by KMPQ, the way in which output volatility declined says a great deal about
what may have lead to this change.  Before we discuss the ways in which sales volatility impacts
production volatility as agents minimize an inter-temporal cost function, this section studies
historical patterns in the volatility of production, sales, and inventories in the automobile
industry.  We first show that the automobile industry exhibits volatility changes that are even
more dramatic than the aggregate, but qualitatively similar.  We then show that other features of
aggregate inventory and production behavior are also present in the automobile industry.
Finally, we uncover a structural change in the process governing sales.
III.A  Variances and Covariances of Production, Sales and Inventories
 Table 1 shows the volatility of output growth in the aggregate economy as well as in the
key sectors of durable goods and motor vehicles.  Following the strategy of McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000), we first test the variance of quarterly real (chain-weighted) motor vehicle
output growth for a structural break.  The estimated break date occurs in the first quarter of 1984,
which corresponds to the break-date discovered by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) for the
volatility of aggregate GDP.  All variables are 1996 chain-weighted data from the NIPA
accounts of the BEA, and volatility is measured as the standard deviation of annualized growth
rates.  The analysis begins in 1967 because of constraints on the availability of data for the motor
vehicle sector.  As the first row of the table shows, the volatility of aggregate GDP growth has
declined by 53 percent from the pre-1984 period to the post-1984 period.
 5   The decline for
durable goods is just under 50 percent while the decline for motor vehicles is 60 percent.  The
last row shows that the decline in GDP volatility is slightly muted when motor vehicles are
excluded.
                                                          
5 The volatility of aggregate GDP growth in the truncated early period is similar to the volatility of the extended
period from 1953 – 1983 as shown in Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002).8
The results of this variance comparison suggest that the motor vehicle industry represents
an ideal case study of the decline in volatility.  Its volatility behavior is similar to, but more
dramatic than, the behavior of GDP and durable goods overall.  Thus, understanding the decline
in volatility in the automobile industry is likely to shed light on the decline in aggregate
volatility.
Another reason to study the automobile industry is the high quality of its data.  While
Table 1 uses quarterly chain-weighted data for comparison purposes with aggregate GDP, data
for the motor vehicle sector are available in physical units and at higher frequencies.  Not only
do physical unit data have the advantage that they do not suffer from index number problems as
one compares inventories, production and sales numbers over a long period of time, but, as we
demonstrate later in the paper, physical unit data can reveal time series properties that are hidden
by chain-weighted data.  Thus, we use physical unit data for the remainder of the analysis.
Figure 2 depicts monthly sales and production of domestic passenger cars and light trucks
in the U.S. from 1967:01 through 2003:12, using physical unit data.
6  Several features in these
plots are noteworthy.  First, car production is less volatile in the late portion of the sample than in
the early portion.  A second feature visible in Figure 2 is the difference between the secular
trends for passenger car sales, which have no trend, and light truck sales, which have grown
steadily since 1980.  Since there are obvious differences in the conditional means of these market
segments, we treat them separately in most of the analysis.
In order to investigate whether the automobile industry displays changes in inventory,
production and sales behavior similar to the changes in durable goods discovered by KPMQ,
Table 2 reports the variance decomposition for physical unit data on cars and trucks in the U.S.
from 1967:01 through 2003:12.
7  One important difference between the time-series properties of
physical unit data and NIPA data used in other studies is that stationarity tests on the logarithm
of physical unit variables reject a unit root in favor of a deterministic trend, with perhaps a break
in trend around 1984 for trucks.  Thus, variance here is based on deterministically detrended
                                                          
6 Data for light truck production is not available before 1977.  The data appendix describes the data sources for all of
the data used.
7 The variances and covariances do not add up because we have excluded imports and exports to and from Canada
and Mexico.  When these elements are included in the analysis, production volatility drops even further as the new
Big Three plants in Mexico produce in a fashion that is negatively correlated with U.S. production.  U.S. Exports to
Canada and Mexico have little impact on the variance of sales.  While import/export activity within North America
raises additional interesting questions, it further augments the results obtained here and does not cause them.9
data.
8  Within the class of trucks, we would also prefer to focus solely on light trucks, since they
are mostly a consumer product like cars.  Unfortunately, complete data on production and
inventories back to 1967 are only available for all trucks.  Heavy trucks represented 22 percent
of truck production in 1967 but only 7 percent in 2000 as light truck production grew.
Consider first the case of cars, shown in the top panel of Table 2.  Both seasonally
adjusted and unadjusted data show that the variance of production and the variance of sales fall
after 1984.  Moreover, the variance of production falls by a larger percentage than sales, and the
covariance of inventory investment with final sales become more negative after 1984.
The results for trucks, shown in the bottom panel of Table 2, are similar in the seasonally
adjusted data, but not in the unadjusted data.  In the unadjusted data, the variances of both
production and sales falls in the second period, but the variance of production falls by
proportionally less than the variance of sales so that the variance of production relative to sales is
higher in the second period.  As is evident in Figure 2, the seasonality of light truck production is
much greater in the second period.  As trucks were increasingly marketed as passenger vehicles,
production fluctuations due to model year changeovers became more pronounced. In both
adjusted and unadjusted data, however, the covariance of inventory investment with final sales
does become more negative after 1984, just as in the case of cars.
Thus, physical unit data in the automobile industry exhibit the same changes in the
relative variances and covariances highlighted by KPMQ in the chain-weighted durable goods
data. The automobile industry has also implemented many of the technological changes
showcased by KMPQ in their advocacy of the “Information Technology Hypothesis.”  It
developed many of the advances in assembly line technology and was one of the first industries
to adopt just-in-time inventory management in the 1980s.  Therefore, if advances in information
technology have revolutionized the fundamentals of U.S. manufacturing and distribution, and
have delivered unprecedented economic stability as a consequence, a natural place to look for
plant-level evidence is within the automobile industry.
Yet, the lack of a trend in the inventory-to-sales ratio is even more apparent within the
automobile industry than within the entire nonfarm sector.   Figure 3 depicts this ratio in terms of
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the number of month’s worth of sales (in physical units) in the domestic inventory stock of cars
and light trucks.
9  While this ratio shows a great deal of seasonal and business cycle variation,
the average has been remarkably stable.  Thus, the behavior of inventory-sales ratios does not
support this version of the information technology story.
It is therefore interesting to explore an alternative explanation for the changes in
production and sales volatility.  In particular, is it possible that the decline in production
volatility relative to sales stems from changes in the nature of the sales process rather than from
changes in the structure of production and inventories?  We investigate this possibility in several
steps.  The next subsection first uncovers changes in the sales process.  The remainder of the
paper then demonstrates how changes in the sales process can explain the observed patterns
without recourse to structural change in the way firms manage production.
III.B  Persistence of Aggregate Motor Vehicle Sales
The decrease in the volatility of both U.S. motor vehicle production and sales depicted in
the tables above arises from two potential sources:  (1) a reduction in the magnitude of shocks to
these series, and (2) a change in the dynamic processes that propagate these shocks.  Since
production decisions are made in accordance with forecasts of future sales, the volatility of
production depends not only on the variance of the shocks to the sales process, but also on the
persistence of these shocks (see Blanchard (1983)). Additional insight is therefore found by
comparing the persistence and volatility of sales shocks between the two periods.  Within the
automobile industry, such an exercise reveals that the sales shocks since 1984 have been less
persistent than those prior to 1984.
Consider the following univariate model of the process for monthly domestic sales data
from 1967:1 through 2003:12:
(2)  log( ) log( ) log( ) 11 2 0 1 1 2 Sales Sales trend D D Sales D trend to t t t t t t tt αα α ββ β ε = + ⋅ + ⋅+ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅+ −−
where   ( ) t D N t ⋅ + 3
2 , 0 ~ β σ ε
                                                          
9 Because data for inventories of light trucks are not available before 1972, the pre-1972 numbers are for cars only.
Inventory-sales ratios of cars and light trucks are very similar.11
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This model allows a change in 1984:1 for all parameters, which include the coefficient on
lagged sales, the constant, the slope of the trend, and the variance of the residual.  We estimate
this model via maximum likelihood for cars alone, light trucks alone, and for the combination of
cars and light trucks, which we call “motor vehicles.”  In all cases the regression is estimated
with the logarithm of seasonally adjusted unit sales from the BEA.
Table 3 shows the results of this exercise, and the coefficient estimates indicate
significant changes have occurred in the process governing sales.  The constant term and the
lagged sales coefficient are different across the two periods for all three aggregates.  The trend
(which is not significant for the entire period) changes in the cases of light trucks and motor
vehicles.  As for the variance of the shocks, there is a significant decline for light trucks, but not
for cars or the motor vehicle aggregate.
Of particular interest to our analysis is the change in the coefficient on lagged sales,
which measures the persistence of shocks to monthly sales.  For all three vehicle categories the
first-order autocorrelation of sales falls between the early and the late periods.  For passenger
cars this parameter falls from 0.85 to 0.55, and for trucks it falls from 0.9 to 0.7.  When all motor
vehicles are grouped together, this estimate declines from almost 0.9 to 0.6.
This reduction in the serial correlation of car and light truck sales in the time domain is
also visible in the frequency domain, where the spectral density portions out total variance
among cycles of various frequencies.  Figure 4 plots the spectral densities for U.S. monthly sales
of domestic cars (left side) and light trucks (right side) in physical units for the pre- and post-
1984 periods in the upper set of graphs.
10  In the lower graphs, the solid line is the log ratio of the
two densities (early-to-late) at each frequency, and the dashed line is the log ratio of the total
variance in the two periods, which represents the change in the average height of the spectra.
Thus, frequencies for which the spectral ratio is greater than the variance ratio contribute more
than proportionately to the reduction in total variance.  Frequencies for which the spectral ratio
lies below the variance ratio represent cycles that contribute less than proportionately to the
                                                          
10 Spectral densities are constructed for sales as the deviation from trend of the logarithm of physical units.  The
densities are smoothed with the Bartlett kernel with window length equal to the square root of the sample size.12
decline in total variance.  When the spectral ratio lies below zero, cycles in this range of
frequencies actually cause more variance in the late period than in the early period.
In the case of cars, the total sales variance attributable to cycles with frequencies below
0.4×π are markedly lower in the post-1984 period than in the pre-1984 period, while cycles with
higher frequencies appear to have increased in variance.  A frequency of 0.4×π in monthly data
corresponds to a period of five months.  In the case of light trucks, the log ratio of early-to-late
spectra lies above zero at all frequencies, but the variance decline again is particularly stark at
lower frequencies.  These observations in the frequency domain are equivalent to the reduction
in serial correlation measured in the time domain above for car and light truck sales, and to the
reduction in innovation variance measured for light truck sales.
To determine whether more disaggregated sales data also show a change in persistence,
the AR(1) model is estimated on unit sales at the company and division levels.  Ideally, one
would like to examine sales at the assembly-plant level, since this is most important for
production scheduling.  The distribution of models across plants, however, makes it difficult to
calculate plant-level sales.   Not only does each assembly plant source multiple vehicle models,
but most models are produced by several plants as well, and companies frequently shift models
across plants.  While monthly sales are available at the model level, these are often not suitable
for analysis because many have short life cycles, and these life-cycle patterns affect the estimates
of persistence.
Thus, Equation 2 is estimated with sales for the companies and divisions that exist in both
periods.  Because disaggregated sales data are available only for cars in the earlier period, we
estimate the equation only for cars and not light trucks.  Table 4 displays the results of this
disaggregated exercise.
11  The decline in the persistence of sales shocks is similar for the
division-level data for General Motors and Ford.  Every division shows a decline in persistence,
with magnitudes similar to those found for the aggregate for cars.  Only a few cases show any
                                                          
11 Because strikes have large effects on particular companies, we include a dummy variable for each month affected
by the strike plus the month afterward.  (See the data appendix for details on strike dates.)  The econometric model
is otherwise the same as the one used for the aggregate industry data.  Monthly sales are seasonally adjusted with the
BEA’s seasonal adjustment factor for cars.13
significant change in the variance of the innovations.
12  Chrysler Corporation, however, is an
exception.  Only one of its divisions shows a marginally significant change in persistence.
In summary, for aggregate motor vehicle sales as well as for most company divisions, the
sales process in the post-1984 period returns to its mean much more quickly following a surprise
than was previously the case in earlier decades.  It is also clear that most of the change in the
unconditional variance of sales described in the tables above comes from a change in the
propagation mechanism for sales rather than in the variance of sales shocks.
These results beg the question: why did the persistence of automobile sales decline?  One
might suspect that the change in the sales process owes to changes in foreign trade.  For
example, domestic sales of domestically produced vehicles include not only the sales of Big
Three vehicles, but also foreign nameplates that are produced domestically.  Since the number of
the vehicles in this category has grown steadily during the 1990s, one might suspect that changes
in the definition of “domestic sales” are responsible for the change in their persistence.  When
estimating the sales process of Big Three-only vehicles, however, the first-order autocorrelation
declines by 0.33, an almost identical amount to the estimates for all domestic sales.  The same is
true when the definition of sales is expanded to domestic sales of all autos (including imports),
and when exports are included in total sales of domestic manufacturers.  Thus, including or
excluding imports, exports and transplants does not change the basic results.
Ideally, one would do a structural analysis of a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of
this durable goods oligolopoly to determine the source of the change.  Data and space limitations
prevent us from doing a full structural analysis here.  Instead, we offer some reduced form
evidence that may be suggestive of the source of the decline.
Likely candidates for the change in sales persistence are changes in the variables that
affect automobile demand, such as: (1) firms’ pricing behavior; (2) interest rates, perhaps due to
changes in the conduct of monetary policy; and (3) aggregate income.  Suppose that automobile
sales depend on prices, aggregate income, interest rates, and an unobservable shock.  When we
estimate a univariate AR process on auto sales alone, the estimated autocorrelation depends on
the data generating processes of these other variables as well as shocks to demand.  Suppose that
automobile companies began to aggressively offer incentives and price discounts in the 1980s on
                                                          
12 We do not put as much weight on the change in variance estimates because of the inclusion of the strike dummy
variables.  All of the major strikes occurred in the early period, and we used 13 dummy variables to eliminate their
effects.  The dummy variables serve to decrease the estimated variance of the innovation.14
certain vehicles to rekindle sagging demand.  If these price incentives represent a significant
change of practice, are used only at key points in time and have been successful in their aim, then
sales shocks in the univariate model would appear less persistent.  Alternatively, if the monetary
authority has become more aggressive in using interest rates to respond to underlying shifts in
the economy that also affect automobile sales, then the measure of sales persistence in the
univariate model would again appear to have declined.
To determine whether any of these variables can account for the reduction in the
autocorrelation of sales observed above, we augment Equation 2 (using aggregate automobile
sales) with the current value and four lags of real automobile prices, real income, and nominal
interest rates.
13 Assuming that automobile firms do not adjust their prices to the current month’s
sales shock, this equation can roughly be viewed as a demand equation.  The aim of this exercise
is to test whether including any of these other variables makes the estimated persistence
parameter constant across the periods, thus indicating that the behavior of the extra variable was
the source of the difference.
Table 5 displays the results.  The first row shows the estimated change in persistence for
the baseline with no other variables.  For all classes of vehicles, the change in the persistence
across periods is significantly negative.  The second row adds real motor vehicle prices.  For
every class, the estimates are similar to the baseline and remain negative and significant.  The
third row adds real income instead, which does reduce the magnitude of the change after 1984,
but the estimated change is still statistically significant.  The results in the fourth row indicate
that the interest rate has the largest impact on the change in the AR(1) estimate.  The magnitude
of the change falls noticeably relative to the baseline, and 1984 no longer represents a
statistically significant break date for cars or for all motor vehicles.  These changes become even
smaller when all three variables are included.  For cars and motor vehicles, the estimates are less
than half what they were in the baseline case and are not significant.  In the case of light trucks,
the estimates are less than in the baseline case, but are still significant.
In summary, it appears that the change in persistence in sales owes in part to the behavior
of interest rates and perhaps income over the two periods.  Surprisingly, including prices does
not have any explanatory power.
                                                          
13 The demand for automobiles should depend on the rental cost in theory.  Rental cost variables have less
explanatory power than the components (interest rates and prices) entered separately.15
IV.  The Effect of Sales Persistence on Production Decisions
The crux of the IT hypothesis proposed by KMPQ rests on technological innovations in
the production process that change the way production is scheduled and inventories are managed,
given a fixed sales process.  Their presentation of evidence implicitly assumes there is a fixed
relationship between the variance of production and the variance of sales in the absence of
structural change.  In this section, we show how a change in the sales process alone modifies the
relationship between production, inventories and sales.  This is true in the standard production
smoothing model when cost functions are convex (see Blanchard (1983), Ramey and Vine
(2003b)), but is more likely when cost functions are non-convex.  Here we examine the more
realistic plant-level model with non-convex costs and lumpy production margins.  Specifically,
we show that a decline in the persistence of sales shocks decreases the relative variance of
production over sales even without IT effects on production scheduling.  Using a model
calibrated to the cost parameters of the U.S. automobiles industry, we show that the sales
persistence changes found in the data are sufficient to explain the changing relative volatilities of
production and sales.
IV.A  Production Margins in Automobile Assembly Plants
In order to understand the sources of output volatility and the inventory management
techniques in the automobile industry, it is critical to first understand the institutional structure of
the automobile industry, its labor union, and the mechanical processes involved on the assembly
line.  Managers of auto assembly plants have several margins at their disposal to meet production
quotas, many of which involve altering the period of production as opposed to the rate of
production.
Let Qit represent the monthly output volume for plant i.  Qit is then a product of the
following margins: (1) the number of weeks in month t the plant is open; (2) the days per week
the plant operates; (3) the number of shifts working each day; (4) the length of each shift; and (5)
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The institutional structures in automobile manufacturing have various implications for the
marginal costs of using and for the fixed costs of changing these margins.  Aizcorbe (1990,
1992), for example, documents the implications for marginal cost found in the labor contract
between automobile manufacturers and the United Auto Workers.  Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)
and Hall (2000) both study the ways in which production margin changes impact the volatility of
plant output.  A conclusion that is common to these as well as other automobile industry studies
is that the constraints placed on production scheduling by union rules and the high cost of
retooling an assembly line make the plant’s cost function non-convex over many ranges of
output.
Consider first the number of hours an assembly plant works each week.  Changes in
regular (non-overtime) hours most often take the form of closing the plant for an entire week.
This is called intermittent production, which is often preferable to operating a curtailed schedule,
called a short week, because plants are required by union contract to pay short-week
compensation to workers with at least one year of service.  This is 85 % of a workers' regular pay
for each hour less than 40 they did not work.  Closing the plant for the entire week, on the other
hand, entails laying workers off, in which case they receive 95% of their straight week pay
through a combination of state Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Supplemental Unemployment
Benefits (SUB).
14
The length of a workweek may be extended temporarily with overtime hours.  Overtime
hours take the form of one or two extra hours at the end of a regular eight-hour shift or as a Sat-
urday shift.  Employees who work more than eight hours per day or more than forty hours per
week receive a 50% wage premium for the extra hours.  Overtime hours are intended to be
temporary and assembly plants are prevented from using overtime permanently in lieu of hiring
additional workers.  Frequent discontinuous spells of overtime, however, are not uncommon.
Long-term adjustments to production may involve adding or dropping the night shift.
Most auto assembly plants operate with one or two shifts, though U.S. automakers began
designing three-shift schedules in the early 1990s to increase capacity at certain facilities.  The
                                                          
14 The state governments pay UI, and assembly plants contribute indirectly according to their experience rating.
SUBs are negotiated between the automakers and the UAW, and the plants support this fund on an employee-hour
basis.  Hall (2000) estimates that assembly plants pay 60 cents for each dollar distributed with UI and SUB.17
second shift pays a 5% shift premium and the third shift a 10% premium.  Adding a shift
involves a negotiation process with the UAW and an increase in the number of production and
overhead workers on the payroll.  Thus, adding a shift obliges the plant to increase their outlay of
employee benefits.  These benefits depend on the size of the payroll and not on whether these
workers are actually on the job in a given week.  A plant's long-run liabilities change
substantially when new workers are hired.
Finally, the rate of production may be changed directly by slowing or accelerating the line
speed.  Line speed changes require a reorganization of the assembly line, which implies a period
of downtime before the redesigned line is complete. Workers do not simply assemble cars faster
when line speeds increase.  Instead, each shift hires more workers. The UAW typically becomes
involved with changes in the line speed as well.
15
IV.B  Cost Function Simulation with Inventories
Not surprisingly, the nature of assembly line technology and the language written into the
UAW contract imply several levels of production that are either prohibitively expensive or
physically impossible to attain.  As a result it is perfectly rational for plant-level production
decisions to yield output volumes that fluctuate much more than sales.  Most notably, managers
have the options of closing down an assembly line at weeklong intervals, which is an option they
exercise regularly, and adding and paring entire shifts.
This section takes the cost function for an automobile assembly plant described by
Bresnahan and Ramey (1994) and Hall (2000) and investigates how properties of the sales
processes feed into the cost-minimization objective function and determine production.  In
particular, the optimal production behavior from a sales process with persistent shocks is
compared with the production behavior from a sales process with more transitory shocks.  The
conclusion is that the relationship between the volatility of production and the volatility of sales
is non-linear and depends on the dynamic properties of sales.
                                                          
15 Ford was negotiating with the UAW in the third quarter of 2001 in order to reduce production capacity for the
Ford Explorer built at its Kentucky Truck facility, and the Ford Taurus / Mercury Sable, both built in Atlanta, GA
and Chicago, IL.  While Ford would prefer to pare shifts at all of these facilities, the UAW are urging instead that
line speeds be reduced and the number of tag-relief workers be trimmed.  (The Wall Street Journal, December 18,
2001)18
IV.B.1  The Automobile Assembly Plant Production Cost Environment
In order to minimize the discounted present value of short-run production costs while
meeting vehicle sales, the plant manager schedules the workweek of the plant by choosing the
number of shifts scheduled in week t, Sht, the number of days the plant will open in week t, Dt,
and the length of each shift, ht.  The line speed, lst, in terms of vehicles per hour, combines with
the workweek variables to determine the weekly level of output as in Equation 4.
(4)                                     t t t t t ls h D Sh Q × × × =
The line speed can be thought of as the plant’s production function, as it is the flow of
output made possible by employing capital, kt, and the labor services of production workers, nt.
In this simulation we follow Hall’s (2000) characterization of the line-speed as a Cobb-Douglas
production function shown in Equation 5.  The fact that a certain quantity of workers is
necessary to achieve any positive level of output is reflected in the presence of overhead
production workers, n .
(5)                                       ()
γ γ n n k ls t t t − ⋅ =
− 1
The plant manager then solves a dynamic program built from this production identity and
a series of weekly cost functions.  The particular cost function used in this simulation is depicted
in Equation 6.
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The combination of production margins the plant manager chooses to obtain Q vehicles
in week t will determine the value of each line in Equation 6.  The first line contains the regular
hours wage bill, while the second line captures the 85% short-week compensation that must be
paid to workers who spend more than 0 but less than 40 hours per week on the job.  The number
of shifts is chosen in the prior week from the set of 1, 2 or 3.  The hourly wage for the j
th shift is
denoted  wj, and I is an indicator variable that returns a value of 1 when the expression in
parentheses is true.  The third and fourth lines are the 50% overtime premia charged to the plant
when daily work hours exceed eight or the number of days scheduled exceeds five.  The fifth line
captures the costs associated with opening and closing the plant for the entire week, where the
first term represents the cost of laying workers off and the second term is the fixed cost of
opening the plant each week, δ .
The production schedule chosen each week depends on the following variables:  (1) the
level of sales in the current week, (2) expected level of sales in future weeks, (3) the plant’s
operating status in the prior week and (4) the level of inventory available in week t to help meet
current and future sales.  The stock of inventory carried from period t to t+1, therefore, is one
channel through which past production decisions enter into the current environment.  Equation 7
is the inventory identity used in this exercise, which simply states that the inventory level at the
end of the current period, It, is equal to last period’s inventory plus current production, minus
current sales, St. The stock of inventory is constrained to lie within an interval depicted in
Equation 8.
 16  Inventory holding enters the cost function in terms of its deviation from a desired
level, which is determined by the target inventory-to-sales ratio, ω
*.
17
(7)                                                       t t t t S Q I I − + = − 1
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16 In a stochastic sales setting, this no stock-out condition is equivalent to requiring that the inventory stock after
current period production but before current period sales is large enough to accommodate the largest possible
realization of sales.
17 This accelerator term is common in many inventory models, and is particularly well-suited to the automobile
industry. Not only do the automakers and auto trade publications track and respond to this statistic (days’ supply)20
The second channel through which the plant’s history affects current decisions involves
the fixed adjustment costs the plant incurs when the production schedule is changed.  Bresnahan
and Ramey (1994) present evidence that changing the line speed or the number of shifts working
entails high adjustment costs, while changing other margins, such as scheduling overtime hours
and closing the plant for week-long intervals, involves relatively low adjustment costs.  In our
exercise, changing the number of shifts entails a fixed adjustment cost, αSh.
The total cost incurred in week t is a combination of c(ht , Dt| Sht), which includes the
intra-period wage bill and the fixed cost of opening the plant each week, the inventory carryover
charge governed by the parameter αI, and the fixed adjustment cost of changing the number of
shifts working, αSh. The inter-temporal cost function denoted as C(ht , Dt , Sht+1|It-1, St,  Sht) is in
Equation 9.
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IV.B.2  Dynamic Program Simulations
In order to understand the production behavior implied by the cost minimization problem
under different sales conditions, this section simulates the dynamic cost minimization problem
the plant manager solves in making short-run production decisions.  In particular, it is of interest
to compare the optimal production path chosen when changes to sales are persistent with the path
chosen when changes to sales are transitory.  In this sense, the first simulation mimics the
automobile industry environment of the 1970s, while the second closely resembles the 1990s.
Due to the prevalence of discontinuities, non-convexities and non-differentiable points in
the plant's weekly wage bill (as a function of units of output), the fixed-point theorems necessary
to solve the Bellman equation analytically for a time-invariant optimal policy function are not
satisfied.  It is precisely the influence of these troublesome points that is of interest in this
exercise.  As an alternative, the plant's problem is structured as a series of 156 discrete weeks (3
years) over which the plant manager must choose the workweek variables from a discrete state
space.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
very actively, but previous automobile studies have deemed it an important part of the industry’s inventory behavior
as well.  See Blanchard (1983) and Kashyap and Wilcox (1993).21
To make the dynamic program tractable for numerical solution, the decision variables are
limited to the number of shifts hired for the next week, Sht+1, the number of days open in the
current week, Dt, and the hours scheduled per shift per day, ht.  The grids that define the possible
values for each of these choice variables allow the plant manager a reasonable degree of
flexibility in planning the workweek of the plant, but still maintain a state-space of reasonable
dimension for a grid-search solution.
18  In particular, it is possible to schedule overtime either
through opening the plant for a sixth day or by scheduling the shift length to exceed 8 hours.
Inventory adjustments can take the form of either a shift reduction or a weeklong plant closure.
A short week is also available through many combinations of production margins.
The line speed in each period is taken as exogenous and is not a choice variable in this
exercise.  One can think of line speed as a long-run margin, whose optimal value is determined
by the encompassing profit-maximization problem the auto manufacturer has previously solved
when it designed the plant and chose the type of vehicles it would produce in the current model
year.  The set of decision variables in this exercise then determine the workweek of the plant,
given the plant’s configuration and a realized path of sales.
19
Sales evolve as a first-order Markov process, where the realization in any given period
may take one of nine possible values.  Restricting the realizations of sales to a grid of modest
size is necessary if sales are to be stochastically determined in a grid-search solution algorithm.
The inventory grid consists of points compatible with the sales grid and the production
possibilities, and its boundaries range from a fourteen days’ supply to a ninety days’ supply of
the mean sales rate.  The nine sales grid points along with the Markov transition-probability
matrix χ( s’ | s ) are parameterized to mimic a desired AR(1) sales process using Tauchen’s
(1986) procedure.  The unconditional mean of sales, µS, is set to the number of vehicles produced
on two shifts using regular-time hours, and thus both scenarios represent a plant that has
correctly matched its full-time capacity with the mean sales rate.  Mismatches between the
                                                          
18 Shifts may take the value of 1, 2 or 3. Days open per week are chosen from the integers 0 through 6.  Hours per
day are available in increments of 2 ranging from 0 through 10.
19 Taking sales as given in the cost minimization problem does not imply that sales are exogenous to the firm.
Rather, we are using a standard micro result that allows us to focus on only the cost minimization part of the overall
profit maximization problem.  Automakers often use vehicle-specific incentives to boost weak sales, however it is
the assembly plants’ objective to keep dealers stocked with vehicles in demand, and their relationship becomes
strained when the company promotes unavailable vehicles.22
capacity of a plant and its realized mean sales are also very important in the determination of
production volatility, and the implications of such occurrences are the subject of Hall (2000).
Since the evidence we have presented above indicates that the most pronounced change
to motor vehicle sales between the periods 1967 – 1983 and 1984 – 2003 has been a reduction in
its serial correlation, this exercise consists of two simulations: Simulation #1 solves the plant’s
cost minimization problem with a persistent monthly sales process (AR(1) = 0.85), and
simulation #2  solves the same problem with the AR(1) coefficient reduced to 0.55.  These
parameters match the estimated declines in persistence in the aggregate automobile data.  To
determine the pure effect of a change in persistence with no overall change in unconditional
variance, we raise the variance of the innovations in the second simulation so that the
unconditional variance of sales is unchanged between simulations.  Thus, these simulations give
a lower bound on how much of the relative change in output volatility we can explain.
The parameter values used throughout this exercise come from the labor contracts
between automakers and their union, parameterizations of assembly plant cost functions from
previous studies (notably Hall (2000)), and from the relatively stable inventory-to-sales ratio
measured in industry data.  Parameters that are more difficult to discern, such as the fixed cost of
changing shifts and the marginal cost of deviating from desired inventories, were chosen so that
the solution to the high-persistence version of the model mimics the production behavior
observed among assembly plants in the 1972 – 1983 period as closely as possible.
20 
21
The sequence of decisions and the arrival of information are as follows:  At the beginning
of week t, the plant receives its sales orders for week t, after which the managers schedule the
workweek by choosing values for Dt and ht as well as Sht+1 subject to the relevant constraints.
The orders are then filled and the new level of inventory is carried forward into the next period.
The inter-temporal cost minimization problem is then described as follows:
(10)
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20 β   = .999 (weekly discount factor); u = 65% (firm’s share of unemployment compensation); α I = 0.0024; α SH =
2.4 weeks of regular-hours wage; ω
* = 60 (days’ supply); γ = 0.62; n1 = 364; n2 = 58;
11 0.54 [40 ( )] wn n δ =⋅ ⋅ +
(54% of the first shift’s wage bill).
21 Shift changes occur too frequently in the simulation relative to actual data, but the other margins are matched
quite closely.23
where  () t t t t t t Sh S I Sh D h C , , | , , 1 1 − +  is defined as in Equation 9.  The solution is subject to the
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The dynamic program is then solved backwards with value functions.  1000 different
paths of sales shocks are generated with a length of 3 years, and in each case the realizations of
sales are constructed for both the persistent (AR(1) = .85) and the more transitory (AR(1) = .55)
sales scenarios.
22  The plant solves its weekly cost minimization problem, which determines the
optimal paths for the workweek variables as well as for production and inventory stock.  These
solution paths are then aggregated from a weekly to a monthly frequency and their volatility
properties investigated.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 6, which also includes 95% confidence
intervals for certain point estimates and for the changes in the point estimates between scenarios.
In both the high persistence case and in the low persistence (but higher innovation variance)
case, the average (unconditional) standard deviation of monthly sales across simulations is
27.0% of the mean sales rate. The average standard deviation of the optimal production path,
however, changes significantly between the two scenarios.  The standard deviation of production
                                                          
22 The Markov process that generates weekly sales was calibrated so that, on average, monthly sales exhibited the
desired first-order autocorrelation.24
falls from 40.5% of the mean sales rate per month in the first simulation to 28.0% in the second
simulation.  While the average volatility of sales remains unchanged by design between the first
and second simulations, the volatility of production falls.  Accordingly, the ratio of the variance
of production over the variance of sales falls from 2.39 to 1.07.
The simulations also generate a change in the covariance of inventory investment and
sales.  As Table 6 shows, when sales have a persistence parameter of 0.85, the correlation
between inventory investment and sales is 0.34.  In contrast, when sales have a persistence
parameter of 0.55, the correlation becomes -0.15.  The intuition is the same as in the standard
production smoothing models of inventory investment.  If a sales shock is thought to be very
persistent, then the firm increases its production dramatically in order to maintain its desired
inventory-sales ratio, since it knows sales are likely to stay high for awhile.  In contrast, if the
shock is more transitory, the firm is willing to allow a deviation from the desired inventory-sales
ratio since it expects the deviation to be short-lived.
In order to assess from which workweek variables the change in volatility behavior
originates, Table 7 shows the weekly frequency with which various changes to production were
made.  Weeklong shutdowns for inventory adjustment, for example, occur in 10.5% of the weeks
when a shock to sales has a persistent effect, and that figure declines just slightly to 9.7% when
the persistence is reduced.  Shift reductions, alternatively, are much more common when the
persistence of sales is high.  Shift changes occur in 3.8% of the weeks in the high persistence
case, and only in 0.1% of the weeks in the low persistence case.  The frequency of the use of
overtime hours, on the other hand, increases from 14.3% in the high persistence scenario to
21.3% in the low persistence simulation.  Short-weeks in both scenarios are non-existent.
The conclusion of this simulation exercise is that the variance of output and the
covariance of inventory investment and sales are highly impacted by the nature of the sales
process.  When changes in sales are believed to be persistent, the plant often responds by adding
and paring shifts.  Alternatively, when changes in sales are transitory, the plant is more likely to
respond with temporary and smaller measures, such as scheduling overtime hours.  Thus, if a
given change in the variance of sales stems from a reduction in the persistence of the shocks to
sales, this can lead to a large decline in the variance of output relative to sales.  The result is
reached in a simplified production model with certain non-convex costs, but it features no25
changes to the cost function parameters, inventory targets or improvements in the flow of future
sales information.
The next section investigates changes in production scheduling that have actually taken
place at domestic assembly plants.  The changes observed in plant-level data line up quite well
with the model’s predictions.
V.  Evidence on Production Scheduling from Plant-Level Data
Our hypothesis states that the change in the nature of the sales process is decreasing the
need to use the non-convex margins that contribute so much to the volatility of production.  A
particularly illuminating example of this change is found in Figure 5, which plots weekly posted
production in physical units at Ford’s St. Louis, MO assembly plant during 1972 – 1983 in the
upper panel, and during 1990 – 2001 in the lower panel.
23   A feature common to both eras is the
relatively high frequency of weeks where output is zero, which illustrates the intermittent
production behavior discussed above.  In addition to shutdowns, however, Ford eliminated the
night shift on two occasions in the early period – once between 1974 and 1976, and then again
between 1980 and 1982.  In the late period, the St. Louis assembly plant ran two shifts the entire
time and maintained stable line speeds near 50 vehicles per hour in all model years but 1995.
Weekly production in the late period often exceeds the 4000 vehicles produced on two regular
shifts, however, and the source is the frequent use of daily and weekend overtime hours.
In order to measure changes in production behavior more generally among all Big Three
assembly plants between the 1970s and 1990s, we construct a dataset from industry trade
publications that report production behavior at U.S. and Canadian assembly plants on a weekly
basis over the two time periods: 1972 – 1983 and 1990 – 2001.  Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)
collected the data covering the 50 domestic car assembly plants operating in the period 1972 –
1983, and this data set has been significantly extended to include all 103 car and light truck
assembly plants operating within the two periods listed above.
24 
25
                                                          
23 Posted production can differ from actual production in instances of unreported deviations from line speed and
unreported overtime hours.  These are not an important source of volatility, as described by Bresnahan and Ramey
(1994).
24 The period 1984 to 1989 was excluded only because we did not have access to Automotive News from that period
when we were collecting the data.26
The data set was collected by reading the weekly production articles in Automotive News,
which report the following variables for all domestic assembly plants:  (1) the number of regular
hours the plant works; (2) the number of scheduled overtime hours; (3) the number of shifts
operating; and (4) the number of days per week the plant is closed for (a) union holidays, (b)
inventory adjustments, (c) supply disruptions, and (d) model changeovers.  Observations on the
line speed posted on each assembly line were collected from the Wards Automotive Yearbook.
26
Table 8 examines how often each margin of production (i.e. plant closures, changes in
shift length, the number of shifts working and line speed) was manipulated during the two
periods.  The frequency of margin use among all 103 assembly plants is summarized as a
weighted average, based on each plant’s contribution to total production during the period
examined.  Several comparisons between the periods are noteworthy.  First, plants shut down at
roughly the same frequency in both periods.  The weeklong closures are of particular interest, as
these include the inventory adjustments and model changeovers that directly relate to production
decisions.  The frequency of weeklong shutdowns drops from 12.4% in the early period to 11.1%
in the late period, though once holidays are excluded the size of the fall is enhanced somewhat.
Second, the frequency of weeks in which at least four hours of overtime are scheduled has more
than doubled between the periods, rising from 14.4% to 30.3%.  Finally, while changes in the
line speed occur with roughly the same frequency in both periods, changes in the number of
shifts occur in 0.6% of the weeks in the early sample, and occur in only 0.1% of the weeks in the
late sample.  This implies that the average assembly plant either adds or pares a shift 3.75 times
during the early period, but does so less than once (0.626 times) in the late period.
Table 9 further isolates the plant shutdown margin in the early and in the late periods to
distinguish occurrences that are production planning decisions from those that arise as a
consequence of holidays, the end of the model year, and supply shocks.  It shows the percent of
days closed by reason across all plants that were not mothballed, on extended closure, or
permanently removed from service.  Thus it considers only temporary closures as opposed to exit
and entry.  Inventory adjustments and model changeovers each close plants for a fewer number
                                                                                                                                                                                          
25 Data for AMC car plants prior to 1983 were not available, and certain heavy-truck and specialty vehicle facilities
were excluded, such as the AMC General military vehicle plant, and GMAD Truck & Coach in Pontiac, MI, which
primarily produces buses.
26 See Bresnahan and Ramey (1994) for more detail about how data is extracted from the weekly production articles.27
of days in the late period than in the early period, though the decrease in inventory adjustments is
very minor.  The number of holidays has increased, and the frequency of supply disruptions,
such as union strikes, parts shortages and natural disasters, is relatively unchanged.
The drop in the average downtime for model changeovers from 4.3 to 2.3 percent of days
is particularly interesting, as this is the margin through which improvements in manufacturing
technology would be visible.  There is indeed evidence that model changeover technology has
advanced over time, as the industry introduced the weekend model changeover in the 1970s and
the  rolling model changeover in the 1990s.  However, the primary means of managing
inventories in the automobile industry, the inventory adjustment, has not changed much despite
the advances in information technology.
The interpretation of these results comes with several caveats.  First, the distinction
between inventory adjustments, model changeovers and holidays become blurred during the
winter and summer quarters.  Extended Christmas holidays often mask inventory adjustments,
27
and model changeovers often take place during a summer vacation or are much longer than the
technology necessitates during periods with low demand.
28
When the frequency of production margin use rises and falls, the impact this has on
output volatility depends on the nature of each margin.  For example, overtime hours boost
weekly production by up to 25%, while adding a second shift doubles weekly production.  Table
10 complements the frequency of use figures by measuring the importance of each production
margin for the variance of output in the pre-1984 and post-1984 periods.  To do this analysis, we
construct an artificial output measure, holding each margin constant at some base level.  We
determine the impact of a margin on the variance of output by calculating the difference in the
variance of actual output and constructed output.  The numbers do not add to 100 because of
nonlinearities and covariance terms.
29
Table 10 displays three noticeable changes over the two periods.  First, model
changeovers contribute less to the variance of output during the second period.  Their impact on
                                                          
27 Christmas 1982 lasted until almost February 1983 in many plants!
28 An interesting extension of this analysis could evaluate the role of model changeovers in production variance
during different stages of the business cycle instead of over two discrete pieces of time as we have done.  This
would be similar to the Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) study of machine replacement.
29 See Bresnahan and Ramey (1994) for a more detailed explanation of the method.28
variance falls from 31.1% to 20.3%.  Second, the use of overtime hours contributes more than
twice as much to the variance in the second period as it did during the first period, climbing from
a 5.8% contribution to a 13.7% contribution.  Third, changes to the number of shifts at individual
plants contribute half as much during the second period as they do during the first period, falling
in contribution from 24.3% to 12.4%.
Thus, the two non-convex margins that lead to so much variance of output – model
changeovers and shifts – are a less important component of the variance of output in the second
period than in the first.  Furthermore, overtime hours, which are the classic convex margin of
adjusting production, are more than twice as important during the second period than during the
first. This increase in overtime hours is corroborated by the BLS data on overtime use in the
automobile industry as well, which show a significant increase in overtime used from the early
period to the later period.
VI.  Relevance for the Aggregate Economy
The analysis presented here indicates that the persistence of motor vehicle sales has
declined significantly in the post-1984 period, and that this decline can explain observed changes
in the relative volatilities of output and sales as well as the covariance of sales with inventory
investment.  Naturally the question arises as to whether this phenomenon is unique to the
automobile industry, or whether it also occurred in the other sectors of the economy that
experienced declines in output volatility.
At first glance it seems that changes to the autocorrelation of sales are unique to the
automobile industry.  Blanchard and Simon (2001), Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002), and Stock
and Watson (2002) are among those who have tested numerous macroeconomic variables,
including sales, for structural breaks in their autoregressive parameters and have found none.
The motor vehicle sales data used in this study offer two advantages over the sales data used in
these other listed studies, however.  First, the frequency of observation is higher – monthly
instead of quarterly; and second, motor vehicle sales are directly measured in physical units
rather than as a chain-weighted index.
These advantages are important to our results, and we believe that the literature’s failure
to find significant changes in sales persistence may owe to data limitations.  Plant-level decisions29
typically occur at the weekly or monthly frequency, so the appropriate sales data would also be
high frequency.  Also, production volatility most likely depends on the properties of sales in
physical units as opposed to the properties of their value.  These alternative measures of sales, it
turns out, can have very different persistence properties.  The reason is that sales measured in
chained-dollars reflect the real expenditures per unit along with its physical-unit quantities.  As
shown below for automobiles, real average expenditures per car is a time-series with very high
persistence, and this overwhelms any change in the dynamic properties of unit sales.
Table 11 examines how these two data features (the frequency of observation and the unit
of account) affect the tests for a change in persistence.  We estimate the model given in Equation
2, which allows a change in 1984 in the first-order autocorrelation as well as in the conditional
mean and variance, for motor vehicle sales data constructed at different frequencies and with
different units of account.  The first three rows replicate changes in the monthly physical unit
sales process measured in Table 4 for cars, light trucks, and their aggregate.  In all three cases
there is a significant change in persistence, and in two of three cases there is no significant
change in the variance of the error term.
Consider next the lower panel of Table 11, which inter-temporally aggregates the
physical unit data from the upper panel to a quarterly frequency using averages.  In all cases the
changes in the persistence parameter are much smaller in magnitude and are no longer
significant.  The changes in the variance of the innovations, on the other hand, now become
significant in each of these series.  Monthly data imply a change in the autocorrelation of sales
and no change in the innovation variance, whereas the quarterly data imply just the opposite!
The final row of Table 11 tests the final sales of domestic product of motor vehicles for
changes in persistence and innovation variance.  This series is most similar to the types of
variables others have used in more aggregated studies, and it is observed quarterly in units of
chained 1996 dollars.
30    The estimated decline in persistence is even smaller in this case than it
was when measured with quarterly physical units in the preceding line, and the change is not
significant.  The variance of the innovations, however, appears to have increased significantly in
the second period.  Thus, this variable gives answers that are even farther from those obtained
using our preferred data.
                                                          
30 This variable includes exports.  As noted in an earlier section, though, including exports in sales does not change
the estimates noticeably when physical unit data are used.30
The chained-dollar data contains another element that may be masking the change in
persistence: the behavior of average real expenditures for cars.  Chained-dollar sales consist of
the number of physical units multiplied by chained dollar average expenditure per unit.  As the
addendum at the bottom of Table 11 shows, average real expenditures per car show no break in
persistence or variance.  Average real unit expenditures, however, have a high persistence (first-
order autocorrelation is 0.94), so their effect on chained dollar total expenditures likely hide any
persistence changes in the unit data.
31
These exercises suggest that testing for change in sales persistence using standard chain-
weighted quarterly data is not revealing.  While general interest in the decline in macroeconomic
volatility focuses on quarterly U.S. GDP growth, it is possible that the true source of this change
is detectable only at higher frequencies and with less aggregation where unit-valued data are
available and meaningful.  Thus, the correct data to use in order to verify that the results given
here do or do not extend to other industries are high frequency physical unit data, which we
intend to pursue as future research.
At this point, we offer indirect evidence supportive of the relevance of our hypothesis for
the economy overall.  Both the simulations and plant-level data show that when sales persistence
declined in the automobile industry, firms were more likely to vary hours per worker (e.g.
overtime hours) than the number of workers (e.g. the number of shifts).  Varying the hours per
worker typically has a low adjustment cost but a high marginal cost, whereas varying the number
of workers has a high adjustment cost but lower marginal cost.  Thus, firms will use hours per
worker to respond to transitory shocks and will use employment to respond to more persistent
shocks.
To determine whether production decisions in the overall economy appear to have
changed in the same way as in the automobile industry, we analyze the change in the variances
of the intensive margin (hours per worker) and the extensive margin (number of workers) over
the two periods.  The variables used are average weekly hours per worker and the number of
employees in the nonfarm private sector (divided by the population aged 16 and over) at the
                                                          
31 The case for using physical unit data rather than chained value data can also be made by analogy to studies of the
labor market.  One always studies employment variables measured in physical units – either hours or number of
workers.  The stylized facts about labor markets would probably change significantly if economists only studied the
real value of total hours (i.e. the product of real wages and hours) because the high persistence of real wages would
hide the time series properties of the hours variables.31
monthly frequency.  The product of the two variables is total hours per capita worked in the
nonfarm private sector.   We study the growth rates of the variables over the period for which all
of the data are available, which is 1964 to the present.
As Table 12 shows, the variance of total hours fell substantially from the pre-1984 period
to the post-1984 period. Fluctuations in the average hours per employee accounted for 49 percent
of the variance of total hours in the early period but 64 percent of the variance in the later period.
Meanwhile, changes in employment became a smaller part of the overall variance in the second
period.  The covariance also declined substantially.
The aggregate labor data display patterns similar to those found in the automobile
industry.  The use of margins of adjustment is entirely consistent with the theory that the sales
shocks faced by individual firms in the early period had a higher persistence than those faced by
firms in the later period.
VII.  Conclusions
The overview of the automobile industry and analysis conducted using plant-level data
has highlighted several interesting facts that should serve to increase our understanding of the
decline in the variance of GDP.  The automobile industry experienced declines in production
volatility around the same time as the rest of the economy.  The declines in the automobile
industry were even more dramatic than the declines overall.  At least in the case of cars, the
variance of production declined more than the variance of sales.
We presented evidence that the change in production volatility may be linked to changes
in the sales process.  We found that changes in the process driving sales appear to be an
important part of the changes in the automobile industry.  In contrast to the 1970s and early
1980s, a time when volatile and highly persistent movements in sales beset the automobile
industry, the 1990s featured more transient shocks to sales.  We then showed how a change in
the persistence of the sales shocks could lead to a proportionately larger decline in production
volatility over sales volatility.
Plant-level evidence indicates that firms have responded to these changes in the sales
process by reducing their use of non-convex lumpy margins, such as shift changes, and have32
begun to use the classic convex margin of overtime hours much more intensively.  It is likely that
this induced switch is a prime cause of the sharp decline in production volatility.
The brief investigation of the source of the change in the sales process suggests that
monetary policy could be the key. This interpretation is consistent with Clarida Gali and Gertler
(2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), and McCarthy and Zakrajšek (2003), all of who find
changes in the estimated monetary policy function at the Federal Reserve to underlie declines in
the persistence of demand shocks and reduced output volatility.
Finally, an analysis of the data suggests that previous failures to find changes in the
persistence of sales at the aggregate level may be due to temporal aggregation and other features
of chain-weighted quantity indexes.  Evidence from the aggregate labor market suggests that
firms have varied their labor input in a way that is consistent with sales shocks becoming more
transitory.33
Data Appendix
Table 1:  All data are from the BEA’s NIPA accounts, downloaded November 2003.  The data
are in chained 1996 dollars.  At the time of writing this paper, the revised accounts with chained
2000 dollars were not available for the durable good and motor vehicle sub-components.
Table 2: All data for car production, inventories and sales are from the BEA.  Non seasonally
adjusted truck production is from Wards (extracted from the Federal Reserve’s US database).
Non seasonally adjusted inventory stocks and dealer sales of trucks from 1967 to 1983 are from
volumes of the Wards Automotive Yearbook.  The same data for 1984 to 2003 are from the
MVMA (extracted from the Federal Reserve’s US database).  The truck production data are
seasonally adjusted using FRB seasonal factors.  The truck sales data are seasonally adjusted
using BEA seasonal factors.  Car and truck inventory investment series are seasonally adjusted
by regressing them on current and one lag of the relevant production and sales seasonal factors
since the government’s seasonal adjustment factors for inventories do not extend back very far.
Table 3:  All series are from the BEA.
Table 4: Division-level sales data are from Wards Communications.  We include dummy
variables for each month in which sales are affected by a strike, as well as the month afterward.
The set of dummy variables include the following months: 1967:9 – 1968:1, 1970:9 - 1971:1,
1976:10 - 1976:12.  Although most strikes only affect one company, we included the full set of
dummy variables for each company and division to capture spillover effects.
Table 5: The real price of cars is the CPI for new cars divided by the overall CPI.  No truck CPI
is available, so we use the CPI for new motor vehicles for both light trucks and motor vehicles
overall.  Income is from the BEA and the Federal Funds rate is from the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors.
Tables 8–10: As discussed in the  text, all data were collected by hand from articles in
Automotive News.
Table 11:  The additional chain-weighted data are from the BEA.
Table 12:  Data from the BLS.34
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Table 1:  The Standard Deviation of Output Growth
*
(Quarterly data, annualized growth rates)




        GDP 4.5 2.1 -53
        Durable Goods 16.5 8.4 -49
        Motor Vehicles 52.2 20.6 -60
         GDP less Motor Vehicles 3.8 2.0 -48
 
* Based on quarterly NIPA data.38
Table 2:  Decomposition of Motor Vehicle Output Volatility
(Physical units, cars and trucks separately)
A.  Cars
Not Seasonally Adjusted Seasonally Adjusted
1967:2-1983:12 1984:2-2003:12 1967:2-1983:12 1984:2-2003:12
() Var Y 6.31 2.93 3.69 0.90
() Var S 3.94 3.19 2.65 1.89
() Var I ∆ 2.75 3.33 1.29 1.24





1.60 0.92 1.39 0.48
B.  Trucks (includes heavy trucks)
Not Seasonally Adjusted Seasonally Adjusted
1967:2-1983:12 1984:2-2003:12 1967:2-1983:12 1984:2-2003:12
() Var Y 10.45 3.13 9.45 1.20
() Var S 8.83 2.14 7.63 1.18
() Var I ∆ 2.78 3.08 1.76 1.02





1.18 1.47 1.24 1.02
All variables were normalized by the exponential of a fitted linear trend to log production, estimated
separately over each period.
See data appendix for data sources.39
Table 3:  Estimates of Aggregate Automobile Sales Process
Coefficients (and standard errors) from the regression:
t t trend t D t Sales t D t D t trend t Sales o t Sales ε β β β α α α + ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ + = 2 ) 1 log( 1 0 2 ) 1 log( 1 ) log(
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1 : 1984 for     1







Coefficient Cars Light Trucks Motor Vehicles

















































Log likelihood 477.2 486.7 507.7
Standard errors were computed using Eicker-White methods.
 ** denotes significant at the 5 % level.
Sample is 1967:2 – 2003:12, N = 443
Dt = 0 for t ≤  1983:12  ;  Dt = 1 for t ≥ 1984:140
Table 4:  Estimates of Change in Persistence and Variance of Division-level Automobile
Sales














































































* indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level .
+Regressions for Plymouth were run through 1999:12 so that the end of the division wind-down did not affect the results.41
Table 5: Estimated Change in Persistence of Sales: Explanations
Change in Late Period (1984 - 2003) from Early Period (1967 - 1984)
Other variables
included Vehicle Category



































426 observations.  The estimate reported is the difference in the AR(1) coefficient on sales between 1967:1 – 1983:12 and 1984:1
– 2003:12. ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level.
All specifications allow for breaks in the constant term, trend term, and variance of the error term between 1983:12 and 1984:1.42
Table 6:  Assembly Plant Simulation Results: Average Standard Deviation of Monthly














































(-.503 ,  -.475)
Table 7:  Assembly Plant Simulation Results: Frequency of Production Behavior with High
















ρ = .85 75.2% 10.5% 14.3% 0% 3.8%
ρ = .55 69.0% 9.7% 21.3% 0% 0.1%43
Table 8:  Frequency of Use of Different Margins at Big Three Assembly Plants
(Percent of Weeks Used)

















Shutdown of at least 1 day 24.4 10.9 23.4 7.7
Shutdown of 1 week 12.4 9.2 11.1 6.0
4 or more overtime hours 14.4 14.4 30.3 30.3
Change in the number of
shifts 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.1
Change in the line speed 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Table 9:  Percent of Days Closed by Reason at Big Three Assembly Plants
Reasons for closure 1972 – 1983 1990 – 2001
Inventory adjustment 4.0 3.6
Model changeover 4.3 2.3
Supply disruptions 1.2 1.1
Holidays 5.5 7.4
All percentages are calculated using the sum of days during which a plant exists and is not on
permanent or extended shutdown as the denominator.
Table 10:  Importance of Each Margin for the Weekly Variance of Output at Big Three
Assembly Plants
(Percent impact of margin use)
Margin 1972 – 1983 1990 – 2001
Inventory adjustment 28.7 31.7
Model changeover 31.1 20.3
Supply disruption 7.7 11.7
Overtime hours 5.8 13.7
Shifts 24.3 12.4
Line speeds 11.7 9.244
Table 11:  Effects of Using Different Types of Data on Changes in Persistence and
Conditional Variance Estimates of Motor Vehicle Sales












































+The chained data were only available through the third quarter of 2003.
Addendum:
AR(1) results for average expenditures per car (deflated by BEA deflator):
-  No evidence of break in AR(1) parameter or variance of the innovation
-  Full sample AR(1) parameter is 0.935 with standard error of 0.026.45
Table 12:  Aggregate Evidence on the Hours Margin Use
Nonfarm private sector
1964:1-1983:12 1984:1-2003:12
Variance of Total hours 48.9 21.9
Percent accounted for by:
         Employment 30.1 24.2
         Average weekly hours 48.5 64.4
         2 × Covariance 21.3 11.0
Data are from the BLS.  All variables are in growth rates.  Total hours and employment are in per
capita terms.46













U.S. Monthly Car and Light-Truck Sales
U.S. Monthly Car and Light-Truck Production
Figure 2:  U.S. Monthly Automobile Production and Sales
(Physical Units)
month











Figure 3:  Inventory to Sales Ratio for U.S. Domestic Cars and Light Trucks
(In Month’s of physical units)
 
month


























Panel A:  Spectral Densities before and after 1984
1967 − 1983
1984 − 2003












































Panel A:  Spectral Densities before and after 1984
1967 − 1983
1984 − 2003
























* Spectra are calculated with monthly physical unit sales figures in logs.  Light trucks are de-trended with linear time-trend.
Figure 4:  Domestic Motor Vehicle Monthly Sales Spectra before and after 1984
*50






































Figure 5:  Weekly Production at Ford St. Louis Assembly Plant:
1972 – 1983 and 1990 – 2001